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Abstract 
This paper presents an axiomatic framework 
for qualitative decision under uncertainty in 
a finite setting. The corresponding util­
ity is expressed by a sup-min expression, 
called Sugeno (or fuzzy) integral. Techni­
cally speaking, Sugeno integral is a median, 
which is indeed a qualitative counterpart to 
the averaging operation underlying expected 
utility. The axiomatic justification of Sugeno 
integral-based utility is expressed in terms of 
preference between acts as in Savage decision 
theory. Pessimistic and optimistic qualita­
tive utilities, based on necessity and possibil­
ity measures, previously introduced by two of 
the authors, can be retrieved in this setting 
by adding appropriate axioms. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The expected utility criterion was the first to receive 
axiomatic justifications both in terms of probabilistic 
lotteries [von Neumann & Morgenstern 1941] for deci­
sion under risk and in terms of preference between acts 
for decision under uncertainty [Savage 1954]. These 
axiomatic frameworks have been questioned later, 
challenging some of the postulates leading to the ex­
pected utility criterion. Noticeably, [Allais 1953] and 
later [Ellsberg 1961] laid bare the existence of cases 
where a systematic violation of the expected utility 
criterion could be observed. Some of these violations 
were due to a cautious attitude of decision-makers 
in front of uncertainty. More recently [Gilboa 1987] 
and [Schmeidler 1989] have advocated and axioma­
tized lower and upper expectations expressed by Cho­
quet integrals attached to non-additive measures cor­
responding to families of probability measures, as a 
formal approach to utility that accounts for the Ells­
berg paradox (see also [Sarin & Wakker 1992]). Some 
of these generalized expected utility criteria are also 
generalizations of the Wald criterion for decision under 
ignorance. The latter suggests that a decision be eval­
uated by the value of its worst possible consequence. 
Choquet integrals, especially the lower expectations, 
are mild versions of the Wald criterion [Wald 1950]. 
In the framework of Artificial Intelligence, it has 
been pointed out that information about preference 
and uncertainty in decision problems cannot always be 
quantified in a simple way, but only qualitative evalu­
ations can sometimes be attained. As a consequence, 
the topic of qualitative decision theory is a natural 
one to consider [Brafman & Tennenholtz 1997]: can 
we make decision on the basis of qualitative informa­
tion? In this kind of research the set of states of the 
world and the set of consequences of actions are of­
ten supposed to be finite, contrary to classical frame­
works where one of them is infinite. Moreover, giving 
up the quantification of utility and uncertainty also 
means that the notion of expectation based on averag­
ing is given up as well. It contrasts with non-expected 
utilities based on Choquet integrals where the idea of 
average value of a decision is preserved although it 
becomes imprecise. Fully giving up quantification of 
utility and belief leads to a purely symbolic approach 
where uncertainty is represented by a likelihood rela­
tion on events and preference by an ordering on con­
sequences of decisions. 
In [Dubois & Prade 1995] two qualitative crite­
ria, an optimistic and a pessimistic one, whose def­
initions only require a linearly ordered scale for 
utility and uncertainty are proposed as well as 
axiomatic justifications for them in the style of 
von Neumann and Morgenstern and more recently, 
[Dubois, Prade, & Sabbadin 1997], in the style of Sav­
age. In these qualitative criteria, uncertainty and 
preferences are captured by possibility distributions 
([Zadeh 1978], [Dubois & Prade 1988]), and more pre­
cisely in the framework of qualitative possibility theory 
([Dubois & Prade 1998], [Dubois 1986]). As pointed 
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out in [Dubois & Prade 1995], the pessimistic (resp. 
optimistic) criterion is formally equivalent to the de­
gree of necessity (resp. possibility) of a fuzzy event 
[Dubois & Prade 1988] which can be seen as a partic­
ular case of Sugeno integral with respect to a necessity 
(resp. possibility) measure. This framework is tailored 
for one-shot (non repeated) decisions, where the deci­
sion is evaluated by means of a particular state previ­
sion that belongs to the ones considered as plausible 
for the decision-maker. 
In this paper, enlarging the possibilistic frame­
work of [Dubois, Prade, & Sabbadin 1997], we exam­
ine the general case of qualitative evaluations of deci­
sion rules, when the uncertainty is modeled by a mono­
tonic set-function, and the criterion is expressed as a 
Sugeno integral. A Sugeno integral is the qualitative 
counterpart of a Choquet integral, but it only requires 
a totally ordered scale to be defined. While classical 
decision theory uses average to assess the value of deci­
sions under uncertainty, Sugeno integral is a median, 
which can be viewed as a qualitative counterpart of 
an expectation. Moreover, the analogy between Cho­
quet integrals and Sugeno integrals is patent due to a 
similar behavior in the presence of comonotonic acts, 
where Choquet integrals become additive while Sugeno 
integral decomposes by the minimum and the maxi­
mum. We give an axiomatic decision-theoretic justifi­
cation for such a criterion, in the case where there is a 
finite set of states of the world. Before presenting these 
results, let us recall the axiomatic justification pro­
posed by Savage [Savage 1954] for the expected utility 
decision criterion. 
All the proofs of the theorems of this paper are 
included in the full version of this paper. 
2 SAVAGE'S AXIOMATICS FOR 
EXPECTED UTILITY 
Savage has proposed a framework for axiomatizing de­
cision rules under uncertainty where both the uncer­
tainty function and the utility function are derived 
from first principles bearing on acts. The proposed 
axioms can be operationally verified by checking how 
the decision-maker ranks his acts. This section recalls 
Savage's setting and his axioms for justifying expected 
utility and probability functions. 
In Savage's approach a preference relation ::S be­
tween acts (or decisions) is assumed to be given by 
a decision-maker. Such a preference relation is ob­
servable from the decision-maker's behavior. Acts are 
defined as functions f from a state space S to a set X 
of consequences. Indeed the result of an act depends 
on the state of the world in which it is performed: 
the effect of braking a car depends on the state of the 
brake. Let us denote :F = X5 the set of potential 
acts. The set of actually feasible acts is generally only 
a subset of :F. The first assumption made by Savage 
is that the preference relation on :F is transitive and 
complete (g ::S for f ::S g): 
Sav 1 Ranking: (:F, ::S) is a complete preorder. 
Two particular families of acts are crucial to re­
cover the preference information on consequences and 
the uncertainty information on the state space S: con­
stant acts and binary acts respectively. A constant act, 
denoted x for x E X is such that Vs E S, x(s) = x. 
Since ::S is a complete preorder on :F, the set of acts, it 
is also a complete preorder on the set of constant acts 
(which can be identified with X). Therefore, we can 
define the following complete preorder �P on X: 
Definition 1 Preference on consequences induced by 
the ranking of constant acts: Vx, y E X, Vs E S if 
f(s) = x, and g(s) = y, then x �P y-¢::? f ::S g. 
In order to avoid the trivial case when there IS 
only one consequence or all consequences are equally 
preferred, Savage has enforced the following condition: 
Sav 51 Non triviality: There exists x, x' E X 
such that x <p x', where <p is the strict part of the 
complete preordering on X. 
The ranking of acts also induces a ranking of 
events, i.e., subsets of the state space: this is based 
on the use of binary acts. A binary act is an act f 
such that there is a set A � S and two consequences 
y <p x EX where f(s) = x if sEA, f(s) = y if sEA, 
where A is the complement of A. Such a binary act 
is denoted xAy. A partial ordering �L of events can 
be defined by restricting the complete preordering on 
acts to binary acts: 
Definition 2 Relative likelihood of events: Let 
A, B � S. Event A is not more likely than event B, 
denoted A �L B, if and only if Vx, y E X, y <p x, 
xAy ::S xBy. 
Of course relation �L is only a partial preorder­
ing. In order to turn it into a complete preordering, 
Savage proposed the following axiom: 
Sav 4 Projection from acts over events: Let 
x, y, x', y' E X, x' <p x, y' <p y. For all A, B � S. 
xAx' ::S xBx' -¢::? yAy' ::S yBy'. 
This axiom ensures that for any choice of conse­
quences x' <p x, the restriction of the preordering on 
acts to binary acts xAx' defines a complete preorder-
1 For the sake of clarity we use Savage's original num­
bering of axioms 
Qualitative Decision Theory with Sugeno Integrals 123 
ing of events in a unique way. The notion of binary 
act is a particular case of a compound act: 
Definition 3 Compound act: VA t:;:; S, fAg is the act 
defined by: fAg (s) = f (s) for all sEA, and fAg(s) = 
g(s) for all sEA. 
A binary act is thus a compound constant act. Savage 
has introduced a cancellation property, that makes the 
following assumption: if two acts give the same results 
on a subset of states, their relative preference does not 
depend on what these results are. This is called the 
sure thing principle and is modeled as follows: 
Sav 2 Sure thing principle: Let f, g, h, h' E :F, 
let At:;:; S. fAh :S gAh::::} fAh' :S gAh'. 
If three acts f , h and g are such that fAh :S gAh 
then g is said to be conditionally preferred to act f on 
event (a set of states) A, denoted (f :S g)A · Clearly, 
due to the sure thing principle, conditional preference 
is well-defined, namely the property (f :S g) A does not 
depend on the choice of act h. Moreover it is a com­
plete preordering of acts. There is a type of events 
such that conditioning on them blurs all preferences: 
null events. An event A is said to be null if and only if 
fAh :S gAh for any f , h and g. It can be proved that 
null events are impossible in the sense that A ,....., L 0 if 
and only if A is null. 
The restriction of conditional preference to con­
stant acts must coincide with the preference order­
ing on consequences (except for null events). This is 
achieved by the following axiom: 
Sav 3 Conditioning over constant acts: Let x, y E 
X, At:;:; S, A not null. Let x, y be the constant acts: 
x(s) = x and y(s) = y, Vs E S. Then, (x :S Y)A <=> 
X 'SoP y. 
Under the above 5 conditions the likelihood rela­
tion on events induced by the preference relation on 
acts is a comparative probability relation, namely it 
obeys the following characteristic properties: A1 'SoL 
is complete and transitive, A2 0 <L S (non-triviality), 
A3 VA, 0 'SoL A (consistency), P if An (B U C) = 0 
then B 'SoL C if and only ifAUB 'SoL AUG (additivity). 
The setting proposed by Savage presupposes that 
the set of states is infinite. This assumption is neces­
sary for the introduction of the following axiom: 
Sav 62 Quantitative probability: Let f, g E :F, 
such that f-< g, let x E X. There exists U B; a parti­
tion of S such that Vi, xB;f-< g and f-< xB;g. 
Savage proved that a preference relation satisfying 
2This condition is necessary in order to obtain a 
quantitative representation of the comparative probability 
ordering. 
Sav 1 to Sav 6 can be represented by a utility function 
u from the set of acts to the reals. For any act f, u(f) 
is the expected utility of the consequences of f in the 
sense of a probability distribution on S. 
3 D ECISION-MAKING WITH 
SUGENO INTEGRA LS 
Consider again the set :F of acts f, mappings from S to 
X. Clearly if we take Savage framework for granted, 
there is a common evaluation scale for events (i.e. bi­
nary acts) and constant acts (just take the set of acts 
quotiented by the indifference relation). So it is possi­
ble to evaluate uncertainty and preference by means of 
a totally ordered scale (L, 'So) (finite, as we will assume 
in this paper that S and X are finite). The mapping 
from the set of consequences to L is a utility func­
tion p : X -t L. It is supposed that the top h and 
the bottom OL of L are in p(X) = {p(x), x EX}. If 
not, just add an ideal consequence x* and a totally 
bad consequence x* to X. Uncertainty is supposed to 
be captured by means of a set function 0' : S -+ L 
which is a monotonic measure (called fuzzy measure 
by [Sugeno 1977]), that is such that: 0'(0) = OL, 
O'(S) = h, A � B ::::} O'(A) 'So O'(B). This kind of 
set-function is very general and represents the mini­
mal requirement for the representation of partial be­
lief. Especially the last condition is called monotonic­
ity, and is verified by probability measures and most 
other well-known representations of partial belief (in­
cluding belief and plausibility functions, necessity and 
possibility measures ... ). Then the utility of an act f can 
be defined as a Sugeno integral [Sugeno 1977], a qual­
itative counterpart of expected sum, where the sum is 
replaced by a sup (a max in the finite case) and the 
product by a min. 
Definition 4 Monotonic utility of an act 
!Sug 
us(f) = fdO' =max min(..\, dF.x)) 
L .AEL 
where F.x = { s E S, p(f ( s)) 2:: ..\} and 0' is a monotonic 
measure. 
This Sugeno integral is called monotonic qualita­
tive utility, and us can also be written only by varying 
the consequence x in X, as follows: 
Proposition 1 us(f) = max.,ex min(p(x), O'(F.,)) 
where F., = {s E S, p(f(s)) 2::P p(x)}. 
Let us analyze the properties of qualitative mono­
tonic utility. First, let us compute the monotonic util­
ities of some basic acts: for constant acts, it is obvious 
that us(x) = p(x). For compound acts of the form 
xAy, the following property holds: 
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Proposition 2 If J-L(x) 2 J-L(y), then us(xAy) 
max(J-L(Y), min(J-L(x), a-(A))). 
It follows obviously that: us(x* Ax*) = a-(A). 
Moreover us(xAy) is the median of {J-L(Y), J-L(x), o-(A)} 
if J-L(x) 2 J-L(y), and the median of {J-L(y), J-L(x), o-(A)} 
otherwise. In order to explain the intuition behind 
this expression consider the case when someone goes 
to a meeting by car and has to choose a route. As­
sume an act xAy comes down to choosing a route 
such that one gets to the meeting with a huge delay 
if a traffic jam occurs and with a small delay other­
wise. So, x means "arriving to the meeting with lit­
tle delay", y means "arriving to the meeting with a 
huge delay", and A means "no traffic jam". Clearly, 
adopting us(xAy) as the utility of the act means the 
following: if the decision maker is confident enough 
that there is no traffic jam (o-(A) is high enough) 
then he does as if he trusts the delay will be small 
(us(xAy) = J-L(x)); if he has some doubt he might get 
into a traffic jam then the utility of the act reflects this 
doubt (us(xAy) = o-(A)); if he totally lacks confidence 
that the road will be free, then he feels as if there will 
be a traffic jam (us(xAy) = J-L(Y)). More generally the 
qualitative monotonic utility can be interpreted as a 
median, which is satisfactory, since it emphasizes the 
analogy with expected utility which is an average. 
Proposition 3 [Dubois & Prade, p. 134, 1980] If X 
has n+l elements {x0 = x*, ... , Xn = x*} with J-L(xo) 
:S J-L(x!) :S J-L(Xn-1) :S J-L(x n) , then us(f) is the median 
of the 2n + 1 numbers {o-(F.,), x E X, x =F x*} U J-L(X). 
Then, let us check which of the axioms proposed 
in the preceding section are satisfied by the monotonic 
qualitativ� utility function: 
1. Sav 1 is satisfied, as us is an application from :F 
to a totally ordered scale L. 
2. Monotonic qualitative utility does not satisfy the 
sure-thing principle Sav 2. It is easy to show that 
there exist f, g, h and h' such that fAh -< gAh, and 
fAh' >- gAh', which is in contradiction with Sav 2. 
Let B, C, D, E be disjoint nonempty subsets of S. Let 
a- be a Sugeno measure such that a-( BUD) <a-( CUD) 
and a-( B U E) > a-( C U E). Nothing prevents to find 
such a Sugeno measure, since neither C U D � B U D 
nor B U E � C U E. The failure of Sav 2 should 
not be surprising since Sugeno measures encompasses 
very different types of set functions, some of them vio­
lating a weak form of the additivity property, namely 
if (AU B) n C = 0, A >L B => AU B ?.L B U C. 
For instance, there are belief functions [Shafer 1976] 
which violate this property (e.g., with two focal ele­
ments E, F such that m(E) = a < 1 - a = m(F); 
E � A, F � B U C with F n·B j 0, F n C j 0 and 
AnB =0). 
3. The qualitative utility does not satisfy Sav 3 nor 
Sav 4 proper, due to the failure of the surething prin­
ciple. Due to the form of us ( xAz) and us (yAz), it is 
easy to find x, y, z, A, such that us(xAz) = us(yAz) 
and x >p y, which contradicts Sav 3. A similar coun­
terexample may be found that contradicts Sav 4. 
However our qualitative utility satisfies a property 
weaker than Sav 3: 
WS 3 Weak compatibility with constant acts: Let 
x andy be constant acts (x= x, y= y), VB� S and 
V h, x :SP y => xBh :::S y Bh. 
To see that the monotonic qualitative utility sat­
isfies WS 3, let us introduce a new ordering between 
acts, that is similar to Pareto dominance in multi­
criteria decision-making: 
Definition .5 Pointwise preference: f :SP g ¢:> V s E 
S, f(s) :SP g(s). 
Pointwise preference is an extension of the total pre­
order :SP on X to a partial preorder :SP on X8. Let 
X = {x0 <p ... <p Xn} be the set of possible conse­
quences, let f be an act, and let Fn � ... � F1 � Fa = 
S be the subsets of S such that F; = { s E S, f( s) ?. x;}. 
In the terminology of fuzzy sets, pointwise preference 
corresponds to fuzzy set inclusion. The monotonicity 
of the qualitative utility is expressed by the following 
lemma: 
Lemma 1 f ?_p g => us(f) ?. us(g). 
This result is already known: it says that Sugeno 
integral is monotonic with respect to fuzzy set inclu­
sion. Regarding WS 3, if x :SP y, then VA � S, V 
h, xAh :SP yAh. By Lemma 1, we get us(xAh) :S 
us(yAh), soWS 3 is satisfied. Our qualitative utility 
also satisfies a weaker property than Sav 4: 
Sav 4' Let x >P x',y >p y'; A,B � S: xAx'-< 
xBx' => yAy' :::S yBy'. If furthermore x 2P y > y' ?. 
x' then yAy' -< yBy' => xAx'-< xBx'. 
At this point it is important to notice that condi­
tioning on events no longer defines a complete preorder 
on actions, as us does not respect Sav 2 and Sav 3. 
This is of course due to the fact that a- is not neces­
sarily additive. 
4. Monotonic qualitative utility satisfies two 
properties that expected utility does not respect. 
First, given two acts f and g, define the act f 1\ g (resp. 
f V g) which in each state s gives the worst (resp. best 
) of the results f(s) and g(s), following the ordering 
on X (induced by the ordering of constant acts). In 
terms of fuzzy sets this is the fuzzy union and intersec­
tion of fuzzy sets viewed as acts. Due to the pointwise 
preference lemma, us(f 1\ g) :S min( us(f), us(g)), and 
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us(f V g) 2: max(us(f), us(g)). 
As a consequence of Prop. 3, we prove a weak 
form of decomposability of the monotonic utility: 
Lemma 2 Let f be an act and y be a constant act of 
value y. Then us(f 1\ y) = us(f) or J-t(y). 
This property indicates that the effect of decreas­
ing the utilities of the best consequences of an act by 
putting an upper bound to them does not affect the 
utility of the act until a point where the decision maker 
starts neglecting the uncertainty pervading this act, 
and considers that the utility of the act directly re­
flects this upper bound. 
Suppose that you are proposed a lottery, whose 
prize is a trip to the seaside. As you like the seaside, 
you are interested in this game. Now, you learn that 
the prize is changed into a (less preferred) mountain 
trip (m). If f =  seaWO (if you win (W), you go to the 
sea, else you get nothing (0)), then the modified game 
is g = fl\m = mWO. If you are a Sugeno-like DM, 
either g "' f (you think that winning is not plausible, 
so, changing the prize does no harm), or g "' m (you 
think that winning is plausible, so that you identify f 
and g with the prizes). Instead, if you are an expected 
utility maximizer, both g -< f and g -< m hold : you 
do not focus on plausible states, but you make an av­
erage between the possible consequences, acting as if 
the decision problem is faced repeatedly. 
It leads to the introduction of a property which 
is respected by qualitative monotonic utility and not 
generally by expected utility: 
RCD Restricted conjunctive-dominance: Let f 
and g be any two acts and y be a constant act of 
value y: g >- f and y >- f:::? g 1\ y >- f. 
Proposition 4 us satisfies RCD. 
RCD means that limiting the expectations of an 
act g better than another act f by a constant value 
that is better than the utility of act f still yields an 
act better than f. 
To see that expected utility violates RCD, it is 
enough to find real values a, b, a', b', c and a number 
a in the unit interval such that: a·  a +  b · (1- a) > 
a'· a+ b' · (1- a), c > a'· a+ b' · (1- a), and min( a, c)· 
a+min(b, c) - (1 - a) < a1 ·a+b'·(1-a). The reader can 
check that a = 1000, b = 2, a' = 3, b' = 100, c = 10, 
and a = 0.93 yields such a counterexample. 
RCD allows a partial decomposability of the 
qualitative monotonic utility with respect to the con­
junction of acts in the case where one of the acts is 
constant: us(fl\g) = min(us(f), us(g)) if g is a con­
stant act, as a consequence of Lemma 2. 
There is a dual property that holds for the dis­
junction of two acts, one of which is a constant act: 
RDD Restricted max-dominance: Let f and g be 
any two acts and y be a constant act of value y: f >­
g and f >- y :::? f >- g V y. 
RDD states that if an act f is preferred to an 
act g and also to the constant act y then, even if the 
worst consequences of g are improved to the value y, f 
is still preferred to g. Obviously, expected utility does 
not satisfy RDD. In order to prove that us satisfies 
RDD, we first prove a lemma, dual of Lemma 2 
Lemma 3 Let f be an act and y be a constant act of 
value y. Then, us(fVy) = us(f) or J-t(y). 
By direct application of Lemma 3, the following 
proposition holds: 
Proposition 5 us satisfies RDD. 
A more general decomposability property of the 
Sugeno utility can also be pointed out: the max­
decomposability for comonotonic acts. Two acts f and 
g are said to be comonotonic if and only if Vs, s' E S, 
f(s) >p f(s') :::? g(s) 2:Pg(s'). This property was in­
troduced by [de Campos, Lamata, & Moral 1991]. In 
words, two acts are comonotonic if none of them gives 
a strictly better result in state s' than in state s, when 
the other gives a strictly worse result. Note that a sim­
ilar result is obtained with Choquet integrals which 
are not additive in general, but become additive for 
comonotonic functions. A constant act is, of course, 
comonotonic with any other act. Then the following 
property holds if :::::; is represented by a Sugeno utility: 
Proposition 6 If f and g are comonotonic, then they 
verify: us(fVg) = max(us(f), us(g)), and us(fl\g) = 
min(us(f), us(g)). 
4 AXIOMATIZATION OF TH E 
MONOTONIC QUA LITATIVE 
UTILITY FUNCTION 
The point of this paragraph is to show that if a pref­
erence relation :::::; over acts satisfies the axioms Sav 1, 
WS 3, Sav 5, RCD and RDD then it can be rep­
resented by a monotonic qualitative utility function. 
The following lemma will be necessary for the proof: 
Lemma 4 If f 2:P g then f !:::: g, under S av 1, WS 
3, Sav 5. 
The following theorem can now be proved: 
Theorem 1 Axiomatization of the monotonic quali­
tative utility us(f) = maxxEX min(J-t(x), u(Fx)): Let 
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::S be a preference relation over acts satisfying Sav 
1, WS 3, Sav 5, RCD, RDD. Then, there ex­
ists a finite qualitative scale (L, :::;), a utility function 
p, : X -+ L, a Sugeno set function cr : 25 -+ L, such 
that f ::S f' {::} us (f) ::; us (f' ). 
The proof then goes in four steps: 
Step 1. The utility scale is the set of acts quotiented 
by the indifference relation, and u(f) denotes the equiv­
alence class of f. Construct p, on X, by restricting j 
which is complete (Sav 1) to constant acts. 
Step 2. Suppose now that j also satisfies WS 3 and 
Sav 5. Extend u to the set of binary acts x* Ax*. 
Let cr(A) = u(x* Ax*), notice that cr(S) = p,(x*) (1), 
cr(0) = p,(x*), (2), and from Lemma 4, as A � B => 
x* Ax* ::;P x* Bx*, we have cr(A) ::; cr(B) (3). So, cr is 
a monotonic measure. 
Step 3. If furthermore j satisfies RCD, we ex­
tend u to the acts of the form xAx*, and show that 
u(xAx*) = min(p,(x), cr(A)). 
Step 4. First, we prove that for any two binary 
acts xAx* and yBy*, where B � A, RDD implies 
u((xAx*) V (yBx*)) = max(u(xAx*), u(yBx*)). Then 
we prove that 'V f, u(f) = maxxEX min(p,(x), cr(Fx)), 
noticing that any act f is the maximum (pointwise) of 
the XiFx;X*. 0 
Remark: Axioms RDD and RCD can be re­
placed by an axiom of max-min decomposability for 
comonotonic acts, which is a counterpart of the addi­
tive decomposability for comonotonic acts, satisfied by 
the Choquet integral: 
CoD If f and g are comonotonic, then fVg >- f => 
fVg "' g, and f/\g -< f => f/\g "' g. 
It is easy to prove that CoD implies RCD and 
RDD, because a constant act y is comonotonic with 
any act. To prove the converse, just follow the proof of 
Theorem 1. [de Campos, Lamata, & Moral 1991] and 
[Ralescu & Sugeno 1996] prove representation theo­
rems for Sugeno integrals on the basis of comonotonic­
ity and Lemma 2 taken as an axiom. 
5 FROM SUGENO INTEGRALS TO 
QUA LITATIVE POSSIBILISTIC 
UTILITIES 
Two qualitative possibilistic criteria for decision 
making, QU*(f) = maxsES min(1r(s), p,(f(s))) and 
QU* (f) = minsES max(n( 1r(s)), p,(f( s))) , where 1r is 
a possibility distribution were proposed and axiom­
atized in terms of preference over possibilistic lotter­
ies by [Dubois & Prade 1995, Dubois et al.1998], and 
by [Dubois, Prade, & Sabbadin 1997] in terms of pref­
erence over acts. These two criteria are qualitative 
counterparts of expected utility. The second one can 
be seen as a refinement of the Wald criterion, which 
proposes that the utility of an act be that of its worst 
possible consequence. Thus, QU* is "pessimistic" or 
"cautious", even if the pessimism is moderated by tak­
ing relative possibilities of states into account. QU* (f) 
is high only if f gives good consequences in every rather 
plausible state. On the other side, QU* is a mild ver­
sion of the max criterion which is "optimistic", or "ad­
venturous" since an act is supposed to be "good", as 
soon as there exists a plausible state in which it gives 
a good result. 
Possibility and necessity measures are special 
kinds of Sugeno measures, and it has already been 
shown that the expressions QU* (f) and QU* (f) 
can be obtained from the expression of u5(f) by 
replacing cr, either by a possibility measure or 
a necessity measure [Dubois & Prade, p. 134, 1980, 
Dubois & Prade 1998]. 
Proposition 7 If cr is a possibility measure II, then 
us(f) = QU*(f) = maxmin(1r(s),p,(f(s))). sES 
If cr is a necessity measure N, then 
us(f) = QU*(f) = minmax(n(1r(s)),p,(f(s))) sES 
where n is the order reversing function of L. 
Note that the interpretation of us (xAy) 
max(p,(y), min(cr(A), p,(x))) (y <P x), now depends 
on the meaning of cr: 
i) if cr(A) = II(A), then if the decision-maker (DM) has 
no reason to believe that A will not occur (II( A) is high 
enough), then he will act as if A occurs (us(xAy) = 
p,(x)). It is only when he strongly thinks that A is im­
possible (II(A) is low enough) that he evaluates xAy 
for the worst. This is the optimistic decision-maker. 
ii) If cr(A) = N(A), it is only when the DM has strong 
reasons to believe in A, that he acts as if it occurs 
(us(xAy) = p,(x)). If he does not, N(A) = 0 and he 
considers that the worst outcomes y will occur. This 
is the pessimistic decision-maker. 
6 AXIOMATIZATION OF 
OPTIMISTIC A ND PESSIMISTIC 
POSSIBILISTIC UTILITIES 
Just remember that possibility measures are max­
decomposable, that is 'VA, B, II(A U B) 
max(II(A), II( B)). Therefore, we just strengthen 
the RDD (restricted disjunctive decomposability) ax­
iom, so that for any two acts x* Ax* and x* Bx* 
representing bets on events A and B, we have 
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max(x*Ax., x*Bx.) = x*(AUB)x • .  The strength­
ened form of the restricted disjunctive dominance is 
the following: 
DD disjunctive dominance: V f, g, h, f >- g and 
f >- h :::} f >-g v h. 
Let us point out that DD is an axiom expressing 
that the decision maker focuses on the "best" plausible 
states. It is easier to see, if instead of DD we take the 
following equivalent axiom: 
Optimism V f, g, VA� S, fAg -< f =? f :S gAf. 
Proposition 8 DD and Optimism are equivalent. 
Let us see what it means for an agent to obey Op­
timism on the following very simple example: Sup­
pose that f is the act that makes you earn a gain G 
whatever the state of the world, and g makes you loose 
a loss L, whatever the state of the world. If you obey 
Optimism, then for any given A, f is strictly preferred 
to fAg means that you think that A is rather plausible 
(if not, you would be indifferent). You do not prefer f 
to gAf means that you think that either A is not plau­
sible, or it is and your preferences given A are blurred 
by the fact that the consequences on A which is also 
plausible are very good. In other terms, for making up 
your mind, you focus on the best consequences among 
those of the plausible states. This is optimism. 
Proposition 9 QU* satisfies DD. 
It is sufficient to prove that if :S satisfies Sav 1 ,  
WS 3, Sav 5, RCD and DD, then the preorder in­
duced on events is a comparative possibility, in order 
to prove that rr is a possibility measure, and that :S can 
be represented by a qualitative possibilistic optimistic 
utility function QU*. 
Proposition 10 Let :S be a preorder over X5 sat­
isfying Sav 1, WS 3, Sav 5, RCD and DD, and 
let �L be the corresponding induced order over events: 
VA,B � S,A �L B {::}lAO :S 1BO. 
�L is a comparative possibility relation. 
It is easy to show that if :S satisfies Sav 1, WS 3, Sav 
5, then �L satisfies Al, A2 and A3. Then, we have 
to prove that �L satisfies the characteristic axiom of 
comparative possibility relations: II: VA, B, C, B �L 
C :::} A U B �L A U C in order to prove that it is a 
comparative possibility relation. The proof is trivial, 
noticing that if :S satisfies the axioms, then fVg ,...... 
max� (f, g). Just use bets on events A, B, C to prove 
the result. 
Now, the following theorem is easy to prove: 
Theorem 2 Let :S be a preorder over X5 satisfying 
Sav 1, WS 3, Sav 5, RCD and DD. There exists 
L a finite totally ordered scale, p, : X -+ L a util­
ity function and 1r : S -+ L a possibility distribution, 
such that :S is represented by QU*: f -+ QU* (f) = 
maxsES min( rr ( s), p,(f( s))). 
The axiomatic justification of the pessimistic util­
ity QU. can be obtained in a dual way: first, we recover 
the pessimistic qualitative utility by reinforcing RCD 
instead of RDD. 
CD Conjunctive dominance: V f, g, h, g >-f and 
h >-f=? g 1\ h >-f. 
In the same way as we did for the qualitative op­
timistic utility, we can prove the following theorem: 
Theorem 3 Let :S be a preorder over X5 satisfy­
ing Sav 1 ,  WS 3, Sav 5, RDD and CD. There 
exists L a finite totally ordered scale, p, : X -+ L 
a utility function and 1r : S -+ L a possibility dis­
tribution, such that :S is represented by QU.: f -+ 
QU.(f) = minsEs max(n (rr (s)) , p,(f(s))) ,  n being the 
order-reversing function of L 
Notice that CD can also be represented by a "pes­
simism" or "cautiousness" axiom dual to the Opti-. . m1sm axwm: 
Pessimism: V f, g, VA � S, fAg >-f:::} f t gAf. 
The same example, obeying Pessimism means 
that if you strictly prefer fAg to g (you think that A 
is plausible), then you should not prefer gAf to g (the 
bad consequence L blurs your preferences given A). 
7 CONCLUD ING R EMARKS 
The qualitative decision theory outlined here signifi­
cantly differs from the usual one, based on expected 
utility. It only presupposes a finite setting and a 
linear qualitative scale, while expected utility resorts 
to numerical uncertainty and utility functions, and 
infinite state space or set of consequences. More­
over it is non-compensatory since it rejects the no­
tion of averaging between the value of uncertain out­
comes. Our approach is also very general since the 
set functions representing the decision-maker's uncer­
tainty need only be monotone. The Sugeno integral 
representing utility is the qualitative counterpart of 
Choquet integral, as axiomatized in [Schmeidler 1989, 
Sarin & Wakker 1992]. Medians substitute to mean 
values or bounds thereof. If the attitude of the DM in 
front of uncertainty is taken into account we recover 
possibilistic utilities, thus getting a milder, more real­
istic version of Wald criterion. While our results sug­
gest natural decision criteria in the presence of qual­
itative information and highlight the underlying as-
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sumptions, the axiomatic setting based on acts also 
gives a tool for observing if a decision-maker's way 
of representing uncertainty follows the rules of possi­
bility theory. Interestingly similar results have been 
independently recently obtained in the setting of mul­
ticriteria aggregation by [Marichal 1997]. One strong 
assumption has been made in this paper (and also 
in classical utility theory), which is that certainty 
levels and priority levels be commensurate. An at­
tempt to relax this assumption has been made in 
[Dubois, Fargier, & Prade 1997]. These authors point 
out that working without the commensurability as­
sumption leads them to the theory of uncertainty 
underlying preferential entailment in non-monotonic 
reasoning. Unfortunately, the corresponding decision 
methods also prove to be either indecisive or very risky. 
This paper is only a first step in the direction of 
a full-fledged qualitative decision theory in the Sav­
age style. The next step should be a proper han­
dling of conditional acts, which is nontrivial in the 
absence of the Sure thing principle. Some ideas about 
how to address this question can be borrowed from 
[Lehmann 1996] . 
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